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Almost a century ago, eminent social scientist Max Weber (1967) stated: 
In "action" is included all human behavior when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it. . . 
Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it 
takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in it's course. (pp. 156-157) 
Thus, action is "social" when its meaning and orientation take account of other people. The 
people being taken into account can be present or they can be absent but internally represented 
by the acting individual. When they are internally represented, they can be thought of as "inner 
audiences" (see Homey,  1946). 
There  has  been  a  long-standing  fascination with  the  impact  of  inner  audiences  on  self- 
regulation in many areas of psychology, including clinical, developmental, social, and personal- 
ity. Classic historical examples include the concept of "identification" (see A. Freud, 1937; S. 
Freud, 1923/1961; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; Kelman, 1958), the concept of "reference group" 
(e.g., Kelley, 1952; Sherif,  1948), and the concept of "role taking" (e.g., Cooley, 1902/1964; 
Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1962). Internal or imaginary audiences can be groups, or they can be 
individuals such as one's parents, best friends, spouse, boss, or advisor  (e.g., see Elkind, 1967). 
Inner audiences can influence individuals' responses to themselves  and  to other objects and 
persons in the world. For example, M.  W. Baldwin and Holmes (1987) found that female 
undergraduates liked a sexually permissive essay more if they had earlier visualized two campus 
associates  than two older family members. Moreover, Andersen and Cole (1990) found that 
undergraduates were especially likely to assume that a novel person who appeared to possess a 
few features of their own significant other also possessed a variety of other features of this same 
individual from their own life, filling in the blanks about the novel person in this way. This 
process was more pronounced when the novel person resembled a significant other rather than 
a nonsignificant other (see also Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1995), a n d it can be 
triggered outside of conscious awareness (Glassman & Andersen, in press). 
An  inner audience  is an internal  representation of values, goals, and standards that some person 
or persons hold for one. According to J.M. Baldwin (1911), Cooley (1902/1964), Mead (1934), and 
others (e.g., Turner, 1956; Vygotsky, 1962), people develop a sense of themselves by taking the 
viewpoint of others on themselves as an object in the world. Mead (1934), for example, stated that 
"the individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular 
standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized 
standpoint of the social group as a whole" (p. 138). The motivational significance of others' 
standpoints on the self has been discussed extensively in the literature, including the effects of 
conflicts between different others' standpoints on the self (e.g., parents vs. peers). 
The inner audience representation of some- one's values, goals, and standards for one can be 
contrasted with the values, goals, and standards that someone in one's immediate external 
environment holds for one. The importance of this distinction between private and public social 
influences is well documented in the research on self-consciousness (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 
1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) and self-monitoring (see Snyder, 1979). The present article 
concerns a different contrast with the inner audience that occurs within private self-regulation: the 
contrast between an individual's internal representation of the values, goals, and standards that 
someone else holds for him or her  (other standpoint on the self) and an individual's internal representation of the 
values, goals, and standards that he or she holds for himself or herself (own standpoint on the self; see  
Turner, 1956). Our purpose is to consider both the developmental antecedents  and the functional  consequences  of  
self-regulation  in relation to own versus other standpoints. We do so  within  the  framework  provided  by  self-
discrepancy  theory   (Higgins,   1987,  1989a, 1989b). Using this framework, we review the literature on the role of 
cognitive changes and socialization in the development  of own and other standpoints on self, we predict distinct 
vulnerabilities from own standpoint versus other standpoint self-regulation,  and we reconsider identification and 
introjection as classic distinctions concerning own versus other standpoints in self-regulation. 
Our  use  of  self-discrepancy  theory  as  a framework to understand the role of own and other standpoints in self-
regulation draws from attachment theory-(Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1984), object relations and self psychology 
theories (Eagle, 1984; Hamilton, 1989; Horney, 
1939; Kohut, 1971; Sullivan, 1953; Winnicott, 1965), and developmental models (Case, 1985, 1988; Cicchetti, 
1991; Sroufe, 1990). Self- discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1996b) provides a framework for 
integrat- ing observations from these diverse viewpoints. The work reviewed here primarily focuses on the 
development and functions of self-regula- tory standpoints. Specifically, we discuss the development of own and other 
self-regulatory standpoints within the self-system and the factors related to individual differences in self-regulatory 
orientation. We then examine the psychological consequences of individual differ- ences and gender differences in 
self-regulation in relation to own versus other standpoint. Next, we address the internalization process by which 
significant other standpoints come to be identi- fied within the self-system as aspects of one's own standpoint rather 
than remaining the "felt presence" of others (i.e., introjects; Sandler, 1960; Sandler & Rosenblatt, 1962). Finally, we 
briefly comment on implications for psychotherapy. 
 
Self-Discrepancy Theory: A Model of Self-Representation  
Self-discrepancy   theory   (Higgins,   1987, 1989a, 1989b) provides a framework for understanding the  
development  and  structure of self-state representations and for considering the consequences of congruency and 
discrepancy among various aspects of this structure. Three "domains" of self-representation are differentiated:  the  
actual  self  (the kind  of  person  an individual believes he or she actually is), the ideal  self  (the kind  of  person  an  
individual wishes he or she could be), and the ought self (the kind of person an individual believes he or she should 
be). Each domain of the self can be considered from several perspectives: a person's own perspective on the self 
(e.g., the attributes one believes one actually does possess, ideally wishes  to  posses, and believes one should 
possess)  or  the inferred  perspectives  of  a significant other (e.g., the attributes that one has inferred one's mother, 
father, or another individual believes one actually possesses, ideally wishes one possessed, or believes 
one should possess). A person's own perspective on the actual self is analogous to what is 
commonly referred to as the self-concept. Other self-state representations, such as a person's 
own hopes and wishes for himself or herself (ideal-own self-state) or the duties and 
obligations that a person believes significant others hold for him or her (ought-other self-
state), function as valued standards or self-guides for the regula- tion and evaluation of the 
actual self. Self-state representations related to individuals' own perspectives and the 
inferred perspectives of others exist together within the self-system. These self-state 
representations influence-and, in turn, are influenced by-interpersonal experi- ences. Even 
though representations related to the inferred perspectives of others can be connected with 
specific persons, they are abstractions of experiences within these relation- ships. There can be 
a substantial degree of similarity and overlap in the types of abstrac- tions that are stored 
in a person's significant other representations. The similarity or overlap- ping abstractions 
across these representations can be conceptualized as a "generalized other" self-guide (see 
Mead, 1934). 
A basic premise of self-discrepancy theory is that individuals experience psychological dis- 
tress when they perceive their actual self as substantially discrepant from important self- 
guides. Thus, they are motivated to self-regulate in ways that achieve congruency or avoid and 
reduce discrepancy. The bulk of research to date has focused on examining the emotional 
conse- quences of discrepancy between the actual self and the two types of self-guides: the 
ideal self and the ought self. A discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self, an actual-
ideal discrepancy, represents the absence or loss of positive outcomes and is characterized by 
feelings of dejection and disappointment. In contrast, a discrepancy between the actual self and 
the ought self, an actual-ought discrepancy, represents the presence of negative outcomes in the 
form of anticipated punishment for violation of duties and responsibilities and is character- ized 
by feelings of fear and agitation. 
Self-discrepancy theory has been the subject of numerous investigations (for a review, see 
Higgins 1996b). Much of this work uses an idiographic  measure  of  self-state  representations, 
the Selves Questionnaire (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986). The Selves Question- 
naire asks individuals to spontaneously generate sets of attributes describing each self-state 
representation. In addition, they  rate the extent to which they believe they actually possess, 
ideally wish they possessed, or believe they should possess each self-state attribute. Discrep- 
ancy scores are calculated by comparing the attributes of one self-state representation with those 
of another, noting the extent to which these representational states are discrepant or congruent 
(for specific details on calculating discrepancy scores, see Moretti & Higgins, 1990b). The 
construction of this measure is based on several theoretical assumptions regard- ing the nature 
of  self-state representations and their activation. 
The first assumption concerns the idiographic nature of self-representation. This aspect of self-
representation is noted in many classic works on the self. James (1890) observed that 
individuals vary tremendously in the attributes that they consider relevant to the self. Using 
himself as an example, he noted that possessing expert knowledge in psychology was critical to 
his sense of self, yet it was probably irrelevant to most individuals. Rosenberg (1979) and 
Cooper- smith (1967) made similar points. Yet, despite this acknowledgment of the 
idiographic nature of self-representation, the majority of self- concept measures are nomothetic. 
In asking individuals to spontaneously list attributes for each self-state representation, the 
Selves Ques- tionnaire provides a more idiographic measure than do instruments that ask 
people to rate themselves on a particular set of attributes that are preselected by the researcher. 
As a result, the Selves Questionnaire provides a sensitive mea- sure of self-discrepancy because 
of increased variance in the measurement of both actual-self and desired-self representations. 
Discrepancy scores calculated from nomothetic  measures have proven to be of relatively little 
value and often do not contribute beyond  actual-self ratings (e.g., see Marsh, 1993; Wylie, 
1974, 1979). In contrast, discrepancy scores based on an idiographic measure of self-state 
representa- tions have been shown to predict self-esteem beyond actual-self ratings (Moretti & 
Higgins, 1990b). 
A related assumption concerns the accessibility of self-relevant information. Individuals may vary in 
which   self-state   attributes   are   self-relevant at all (i.e., which self-attributes are available in 
memory) and which attributes are especially relevant most of the time (i.e., which self-
attributes are highest in chronic accessibility). The Selves Questionnaire asks individuals to 
list up to 10 attributes that come to mind in describing each self-state representation rather 
than to list all of the attributes they can think of. In doing so, the measure taps highly 
accessible self-state attributes, which are precisely those that are likely to play an active 
role in self-regulation. 
The final assumption underlying the construction of the Selves Questionnaire concerns the 
issue of awareness of self-discrepancies. Re- search has shown that cognitive constructs, 
particularly those that are highly and chronically accessible, automatically influence the 
processing of information without intention, effort, or awareness (Andersen, Spielman,  &  
Bargh, 1992; Bargh, 1989). Construction of the Selves Questionnaire was based on the 
assumption that individuals are typically not aware, nor do they need to be aware, of self-state 
discrepancies for these discrepancies to influence their processing of self-related information. 
On the Selves Questionnaire, individuals are simply asked to provide attributes describing each 
self-state representation, separately and one at a time, rather than to compare different self-state 
representations and identify instances of discrepancy. We do not assume that individuals are 
aware of their self-discrepancies when they complete this questionnaire any more than we 
assume that individuals are aware of self-discrepancies when these discrepancies influence on-
line processing. 
Each of these characteristics of the Selves Questionnaire ensures the measurement of 
individually characteristic and personally relevant aspects of self-representation. The initial 
research using the Selves Questionnaire was concerned with testing unique relations between 
specific types of self-discrepancies (i.e., actual self-ideal self and actual self-ought self) 
and specific kinds of emotional states. In the correlational work (e.g., Higgins, Klein, & 
Strauman, 1985), participants completed the Selves Questionnaire, recording attributes that 
characterized their actual self, ideal self, and ought self from their own perspective and the 
perspective of significant others. Psychological distress was found to correlate positively 
with overall level of self-discrepancy. More important, type of self discrepancy was 
associated with type of emotional distress: Actual-ideal discrepancy was uniquely related to 
dejection-related emotions (e.g., feeling sad and disappointed), and actual-ought 
discrepancy was uniquely related to agitation-related emotions (e.g., feeling nervous and 
tense). The concurrent relation between type of discrepancy and type of emotional distress has 
also been supported in studies of clinical populations. Strauman (1989) found that clinically 
depressed individuals suffered predominantly from actual-ideal discrepancies, whereas 
social phobics suffered predominantly from actual-ought discrepancies. Scott and O'Hara 
(1993) and Fairbrother and Moretti (1998) have reported similar results using clinical 
populations. 
There is also evidence that self-discrepancy representations are important vulnerability 
markers. For example, Strauman and Higgins (1988) found that specific types of self-
discrepancy predicted unique clusters of emotional distress measured 2 months later. Structural 
equation modeling supported the unique relation between actual-ideal discrepancy and 
depressive symptoms and the unique relation between actual-ought discrepancy and social 
anxiety. Strauman (1992) also found that discrepancies predicted the persistence of distinct 
emotional syndromes over a 4-month period. More recently, Strauman (1996), in a longitudinal 
study, established the long-term stability of discrepancy structures within the self and the 
negative repercussions for emotional suffering. 
Especially compelling evidence of self-discrepancies as vulnerability markers is pro- vided by 
research on the emotional impact of priming self-discrepancies. In these studies, participants 
are exposed to various tasks de- signed to momentarily increase the accessibility of self-
discrepancies. In an early priming study, Higgins et al. (1986) asked participants to imagine 
either a positive event (receiving an A in a course or spending an evening with someone they 
admired) or a negative event (receiving a D in a course or finding out a lover had just left 
them). Participants with predominant actual-ideal discrepancies experienced increased dejection 
and decreased psychomotor speed when they imagined a negative event relative to participants 
with predominant actual- ought discrepancies imagining the same event or participants who 
imagined a positive event. In contrast, participants with predominant actual- ought discrepancies 
experienced increased agitation and increased psychomotor speed  when they imagined a 
negative event relative to participants with predominant actual-ideal discrepancies imagining the 
same event or participants who imagined a positive event. 
Subsequent priming experiments incorporated more sophisticated and idiographically 
sensitive techniques. Strauman and Higgins (1987) developed an idiographic technique that 
involved priming specific cognitive structures. Participants with predominant actual-ideal 
or actual-ought discrepancies were instructed to complete a series of phrases ("An 'x' 
person is . . .") that made reference to attributes that were related to self-discrepancies. 
Control attributes based on another participant's re- sponses (yoked control) were also 
included in the trials. Moment-to-moment changes in mood and arousal were observed. 
Activating actual- ideal discrepancies produced feelings of sadness and decreased 
psychomotor arousal, whereas activating actual-ought discrepancies produced feelings of 
agitation and increased psychomotor arousal. Strauman (1989) replicated these findings in a 
sample of clinically depressed and socially phobic individuals. 
This research is important in illustrating that the activation of specific types of 
self-discrepancies is causally related to the experience of specific types of emotional distress. 
More important, it shows that self-state representations are structurally interconnected; activating 
the attributes of one self-state representation (i.e., a self-guide attribute) produces consequences 
associated with the activation of the structural relation between these attributes and other self-
state representations (i.e., actual-self attributes). 
The importance of the relation between actual-self attributes and self-guides is also supported 
by our research on self-discrepancy and self-esteem (Moretti & Higgins,  1990b). This study 
examined whether the relation between actual-self attributes and the ideal self contributed to 
the prediction of self-esteem beyond the valence of  actual-self  attributes alone. As predicted, 
actual-ideal  discrepancy was significantly related to self-esteem even when the negativity of 
actual-self attributes was statistically  controlled.  The mere presence  of negative actual-self 
attributes did not, in itself, predict low self-esteem. Only negative actual-self attributes that 
were discrepant from the ideal self were associated with low self-esteem. Similarly, only 
positive actual-self attributes that were congruent with the ideal self-predicted high self-esteem. 
More recent work on self-discrepancy theory has focused on the motivational significance 
of actual-ideal versus actual-ought discrepancy. Higgins and his colleagues (Higgins, l 996b, 
1997; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992) have proposed 
that actual-ideal discrepancy represents a strategic approach-promotion orientation that is 
concerned with the presence and absence of positive outcomes. In contrast, actual-ought 
discrepancy represents a strategic avoidance-prevention orientation that is concerned with 
the presence and absence of negative outcomes. Higgins and Tykocinski (1992) first tested 
these predictions by assessing memory for either events related to the presence or absence of 
positive outcomes or events related to the presence or absence of negative outcomes. 
Individuals with predominant actual-ideal discrepancies had better memory for events 
related to the presence or absence of positive outcomes than did individuals with 
predominant actual-ought discrepancies, whereas individuals with predominant actual-ought 
discrepancies had better memory for events related to the presence or absence of negative 
outcomes than did individuals with predominant actual-ideal discrepancies. 
The results of studies by Higgins et al. (1994) provide evidence that regulatory focus can be 
momentarily primed. In one study, participants were asked to report on life changes in either 
their hopes and aspirations (ideal priming) or their duties and obligations (ought priming) . 
Individuals exposed to ideal priming recalled events strategically related to attaining the 
presence of positive outcomes (approaching matches to desired self-states) better than did 
individuals exposed to ought priming. In contrast, individuals exposed to ought priming recalled 
events strategically related to attaining the absence of negative   outcomes   (avoiding 
mismatches to desired self-states) better than did individuals exposed to ideal priming. Higgins et 
al. (1994) also found that approach strategies for maintaining friendships (e.g., trying to be 
generous and willing to give of oneself) were selected more frequently by predominantly 
actual-ideal-discrepant individuals than by pre- dominantly actual-ought-discrepant 
individuals, whereas the reverse was true for avoidance strategies for maintaining friendships 
(e.g., trying to stay in touch and not lose contact with friends). Results of a separate study 
showed that preferences for these different strategies for maintaining friendships could be 
experimentally induced by framing questions to participants to emphasize either a strategic 
approach-promotion focus or a strategic avoidance-prevention focus. 
Other studies have applied self-discrepancy theory to understanding particular syndromes (e.g., 
eating disorders [Forston & Stanton, 1992; Strauman, Vookles, Berenstein, Chaiken, & Higgins, 
1991] and physical health problems [Higgins, Vookles, & Tykocinski, 1992]) and the effects of 
life events (e.g., becoming a parent; Alexander & Higgins, 1993). These studies are not 
reviewed here. The research we have reviewed, however, clearly supports fundamental 
assumptions underlying self-discrepancy theory, specifically that self-representations contain 
personally relevant attributes reflecting how people view their actual self and their valued goals or 
desired end states for themselves, that these representations are structurally interconnected and 
become activated when one component of the representation is primed, and that the activation of 
specific structures produces specific emotional and motivational consequences. Together, this 
research illustrates the scope of self-discrepancy theory in addressing fundamental issues of 
processing structure, processing dynamics, and processing dispositions, all critical elements in a 
comprehensive theory of personality (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). 
 
Standpoints on the Self: Extending Self-Discrepancy Theory 
Research to date has confirmed the basic predictions of self-discrepancy theory regarding the 
psychological consequences of actual-ideal versus actual-ought discrepancy, yet little is known 
about the relevance of the different standpoints (i.e., own vs. other) on the self or about the 
consequences of self-discrepancies involving these standpoints. In the past, most studies 
collapsed across self-guides representing own   versus   other   standpoints   on   the   self, 
considered only one standpoint at a time (e.g., ideal-own versus ought-own), or contrasted 
actual-ideal-own discrepancy with actual-ought-other discrepancy (where domain and standpoint 
effects are combined). Self-discrepancy theory, however, conceptualizes domain and standpoint 
as two equally important orthogonal dimensions underlying self-representation (Higgins, 
1987). Yet, only recently has attention shifted to understanding how the interpersonal context 
in which the self develops molds the structure of the self and influences self-regulation. 
The current article extends previous work on self-discrepancy theory by specifically 
focusing on the development and psychological consequences of own versus other 
perspectives on the self. As previously noted, self-discrepancy theory assumes that various 
perspectives or standpoints on the self are organized into distinct but structurally 
interconnected self-state representations. Individuals may regulate in relation to their own 
hopes and wishes or in relation to the hopes and wishes that various significant others 
hold for the self. Similarly, they can regulate in relation to their own sense of duty and 
obligations or in relation to the duties and obligations that they believe others hold for 
them. There are several potential sources of self-discrepancy related to own-other 
perspectives or standpoints on the self. One can experience discrepancy between the actual 
self and one's own self-guides (actual-own discrepancy) or discrepancy between the actual self 
and the standards or guides that others hold for the self (actual-other discrepancy). For 
example, individuals may · view themselves as overly passive and avoidant (actual self) and 
personally believe they should be assertive and forthright (own-ought). The same 
individuals may view themselves as irresponsible and unreliable (actual self) and believe 
that their parents desire them to be responsible and reliable (parent-ought). These different 
types of discrepancy (actual-own-ought vs. actual-parent-ought discrepancy) can occur 
independently of each other. Each type of discrepancy will create distress, however, because 
each represents a distinct psychological situation with associated psychological and 
interpersonal repercussions. 
The guides that one holds for oneself may also directly conflict with the guides of 
significant others for  the  self.  For example, an individual may wish to be independent and 
free spirited but infer that his or her parents desire attributes such as responsibility and 
reliability. This type of guide-guide conflict can pose difficulties in self-regulation because 
approaching one guide necessarily entails moving farther away from the conflicting guide. 
This "double approach-avoidance" conflict (Van Hook & Higgins, 1988) is vividly 
illustrated in the following excerpt from Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar (1971), in which Plath 
described the struggle of the protagonist between the desire to pursue her own goals and 
those prescribed for women of her era: 
I saw my life branching out before me like the green fig tree in the story. From the tip of 
every branch, like a fat purple fig, a wonderful future beckoned and winked. One fig was 
a husband and a happy home and children, and another fig was a famous poet and another 
fig was a brilliant professor . . . and beyond and above these figs were many more figs I 
couldn't quite make out. I saw myself sitting in the crotch of this fig tree, starving to 
death, just because I couldn't make up my mind which of the figs I would choose. I wanted 
each and every one of them, but choosing one meant losing all the rest, and, as I sat there, 
unable to decide, the figs began to wrinkle and go black, and, one by one, they plopped 
to the ground at my feet. (pp. 84-85) 
 
Van Hook and Higgins (1988) examined the psychological situation associated with guide-
guide conflict that is so aptly captured in Sylvia Plath's writing. They found that participants 
who had conflicting self-guides reported greater feelings of indecisiveness, confusion, and 
uncertainty about their identity and their goals than did participants whose guides were not 
conflicting. 
Another form of guide-guide conflict occurs when the guides that different significant others 
hold for the self are in conflict. The guides that one's mother holds for the self may differ 
from the guides that one's father or partner holds for the self, or a parent may hold guides for 
his or her child that conflict with the guides that peers hold for the child. This type of 
discrepancy may be particularly likely to emerge when individuals undergo life transitions in 
the persons that are psychologically relevant to them. For example, during adolescence, when 
peers be- come increasingly significant, young  people may feel torn between the self-guides 
that their parents hold for them and those that are prescribed by their peer group. This type of 
guide-guide conflict can also lead to feelings of confusion about identity and inconsistent 
self-regulation (see Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995; see also Blos, 1962; Erikson, 1963). 
In understanding the impact of own versus other standpoints on self-regulation, the basic 
assumptions of self-discrepancy theory regarding structural and process issues can be applied. 
One can assume, for example, that the structural organization of self-representations that 
embody one's own perspective or the perspectives of significant others on the self is similar 
to that found in self-representations that embody hopes and wishes (ideal self) or duties and 
obligations for the self (ought self). Thus, one would expect the elements within each standpoint 
to be structurally  interconnected,  as shown in Figure 1. For example, information regarding 
the standpoint of one's mother in regard to the self is probably structurally  interconnected.  
Priming one element within this standpoint representation should activate other elements within 
the representation. Different standpoint representations (e.g., mother standpoint on the self and 
father standpoint on the self) are also likely to be structurally interconnected in ways that reflect 
relationship experiences. For some individuals the experience of achieving to the standards or 
guides held by their mother may activate matches within the father standpoint representation, 
whereas for others this experience may activate mismatches within the father standpoint 
representation. 
The general prediction that the activation of self-discrepancies produces psychological 
dis- tress clearly applies to both actual-own and actual-other self-discrepancies. The type of 
distress triggered by different self-discrepancies may depend on whether the discrepancy is 
related to one's  own self-guides or the self-guides of significant others (see Higgins, 1987). 
What are the "psychological situations" underlying actual-own versus actual-other 
self-discrepancy that might give rise to distinct emotional experiences? When individuals 
perceive their actual self as discrepant from their own self-guides, be they the hopes and 
wishes that they hold for themselves (actual-own-ideal discrepancy) or the duties and 
obligations that they believe they should fulfill (actual-own- ought discrepancy), they 
experience a negative psychological situation associated with their inability to effectively 
regulate toward their own values. This failure is not necessarily linked with how one 
believes others view the self, and therefore receiving reassurances from others may have 
little impact on discrepancy reduction. Rather, the focus of  the discrepancy and attempts to 
reduce it must involve the relation between actual-self attributes and one's own self-guides. 
Feedback from others can be helpful only insofar as it alters one's perception of the actual 
self, one's guides, or the perceived discrepancy between the two. Preliminary evidence 
supports the hypothesis that actual-own discrepancy is uniquely related to a sense of personal 
failure. Specifically, Higgins (1987) found that actual-own-ideal discrepancy was 
associated with higher self- critical scores, as measured by Blatt's Depres- sive Experience 
Questionnaire (DEQ; Blatt, D'Afflitti, & Quinlan, 1976), than was actual- other-ideal 
discrepancy. The self-critical (Blatt et al., 1976; Blatt & Lerner, 1983) or "personal 
autonomy" subtype of depression (Beck, 1983) is characterized by a high investment in           
 
 
 
personal independence and achievement and involves a sense that one has failed to  meet 
one's own standards in this regard. 
The psychological situation underlying actual-own discrepancy can be contrasted  with that 
underlying actual-other discrepancy: When indi-viduals perceive their actual self as discrepant 
from the standards that significant others hold for them (actual-other-ideal or actual-other- 
ought discrepancies), they experience a negative psychological situation associated with their 
inability to effectively regulate toward others' values and standards. Consistent with this 
view, Higgins (1987) reported that actual-other-ideal discrepancy was associated with higher 
dependency scores on the DEQ (Blatt et al., 1976) than was actual-own-ideal discrepancy. 
The "dependent" (Blatt et al., 1976; Blatt & Lerner, 1983) or "sociotropic" (Beck, 1983) 
depressive subtype is characterized by a high investment in close interpersonal relationships 
and involves a sense that one has lost the love and acceptance of others. 
 
Outcome Contingency Beliefs and the Effects of Other Standpoint Discrepancies 
Actual-other self-discrepancy inherently involves consideration of the self in relation with 
others. The impact of actual-other self-discrepancies may be moderated by the beliefs that 
individuals hold concerning the consequences of meeting or failing to meet the guides that 
significant others hold for them. These beliefs have been termed "outcome-contingency 
beliefs" (Andersen, Reznik, &  Chen, 1997; M. W. Baldwin, 1992; Higgins, 1989a, 1991; 
Hinkley & Andersen, 1996; Markus & Cross, 1990; Moretti & Higgins, 1990a). If 
individuals believe that meeting the guides that others hold for them (hopes and wishes or 
duties and obligations) will result in the presence of positive outcomes (e.g., praise and 
acceptance) or in the absence of negative outcomes (e.g., not being criticized or rejected), 
they will be motivated to meet these guides, and they will experience positive affect when 
they do so. Similarly, if individuals believe that failing to meet the guides that others hold 
for them will result in the absence of positive outcomes (e.g., loss or withdrawal of 
acceptance or love) or in the presence of negative outcomes (e.g., criticism and rejection), 
they will be motivated to ensure that they do not fail to meet these guides and will experience 
negative affect if they fail to meet them. Individuals may perceive  their actual self as discrepant 
from the guides that significant others hold for them  but  suffer limited distress if they believe 
that the love and acceptance of others are not contingent on their meeting or failing to meet 
these guides. 
In short, the impact of actual-other discrepancies depends on the nature of represented 
contingencies concerning one's relationships with others. The notion of outcome contingency 
beliefs is analogous to Rogers' (1961) notion of "conditions of worth." Rogers generally viewed 
contingencies of worth as detrimental to self- development because such contingencies re- strict 
self-exploration and expression for fear of loss of acceptance and love. Consistent with this 
view, research (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1987; Higgins & Tykocinski, cited in Higgins, 
1989b) has shown that individuals with high levels of actual-parent-ideal discrepancy who 
strongly believe that their failure to live up to parental hopes and wishes will lead to abandon- 
ment report higher levels of chronic depression than do individuals with the same type and 
level of discrepancy who do not endorse this belief. 
In summary, there is a strong theoretical rationale that supports the distinction between own 
and other perspectives on the self as fundamental dimensions underlying the organization of 
self-representation (Andersen et al., 1997). Furthermore, preliminary evidence, as summarized 
here, suggests that self-discrepancies involving different standpoints on the self represent 
different psychological situations that carry distinct consequences. In the remaining sections of 
the article, we deepen our exploration of the distinction between own and other standpoints on 
the self and implications for psychological well-being. We begin with a discussion of 
developmental issues. There are distinct advantages to understanding the development 
antecedents of self-regulatory patterns; adult patterns of functioning, both normative and 
pathological, are better understood in the context of the developmental  patterns  from which 
they have arisen (Blatt, 1995). Indeed, some might argue that a theory of personality is 
impossible without delineation of developmental factors. In our particular case, it is important 
to understand the differentiation of the self into a multifaceted representational system and, more 
specifically, the emergence of own and other standpoints on the self as distinct but overlap- 
ping representations. How is the emergence of representational thought related  to the capacity 
to represent, consider, and consolidate different perspectives on the self? What is the relation- 
ship between own-other differentiation at different developmental phases and self-regulatory 
competencies and liabilities? We have previously linked cognitive-developmental and parental 
socialization strategies to the emergence of ideal and ought self-state representations and 
outcome contingency beliefs (Higgins, 1989a, 1991, 1996a; Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995; 
Moretti & Higgins, 1990a). In the present discussion, we shift focus and specifically address the 
emergence of own versus other standpoints within the self-system and individual differences in 
regulatory orientation. 
 
Development of Own Versus Other Standpoints Within the Self-System 
 
Although some theorists (e.g., Butterworth, 1990; Stem, 1985) believe that infants are capable 
of greater self-other differentiation than do others (e.g., Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Mahler, 
1968), most agree that experiences of the self in infancy are less differentiated than are later 
self-experiences. Moreover, it is generally agreed, at least at a theoretical level, that internal 
representations that clearly differentiate one's own view of the self from that of multiple others 
emerge gradually and are fully operative only relatively late in development (Harter, 1999). 
Theorists argue (Damon & Hart, 1988; Higgins, 1989a, 1991; Moretti & Higgins, 1990a) that, if 
children are to engage in intentional regulation of the self, they must develop representations 
of the relation between self-features (affect, behavior, and self-attributes) and emotional, 
interpersonal, or other consequences. The complexity of their representational capacity will be 
directly related to their ability to engage in intentional self-regulation and to achieve desired 
goals. Developmental shifts in organizational and mental representational capacity (Case, 1985; 
Damon & Hart, 1988; Fischer, 1980; Selman, 1980) probably underlie qualitative shifts in 
self-regulatory capacity (Case, 1991; Higgins, 1989a, 1991; Moretti & Higgins, 1990a). 
Whereas shifts in cognitive development determine the complexity of relations that children can 
construct, parental socialization  strategies and interpersonal context may determine the type, 
cohesiveness, and complexity of representations that children do, in fact, construct. 
In our discussion of developmental issues, we focus on shifts in representational capacity as 
outlined by Case (1985) and consider how these shifts might influence the emergence of own 
and other self-regulatory standpoints. These shifts will probably occur within relatively set 
chronological periods. As we note in our discussion, however, significant individual variation 
may occur in this regard. To understand the underlying processes of self-development, it is 
important to recognize that different processes may have ascendancy during different periods of 
development. Thus, for example, Emde and his colleagues (Emde, Biringen, Clyman, & 
Oppenheim, 1991) argued that representational structures during infancy are dominated by the 
affectivity of experiences and this weaves experiences together into integrated patterns. As 
development progresses, particularly with the advent of language, experiences are integrated not 
only along affective lines but also with respect to increasingly complex temporal, social, and 
reflective self-meaning. Life transitions in the social context and social developmental demands 
on the self (e.g., with the introduction of teachers, peers, romantic partners, work colleagues, 
and so on) can also dramatically alter the psychological field in which the self is constructed. 
This is not to imply that developments during earlier periods are less important in 
understanding later self-development. Indeed, early representational structures, dominated by 
affective organization, probably play a pivotal role in providing the foundations for later self-
development. The point is that each level of development may be differentially influenced by 
affective, cognitive, and social factors dominant during that period, with new developments 
emerging out of earlier structures (Werner, 1957). Figure 2 provides an overview of these 
emerging structures and illustrates the developmental levels discussed subsequently. 
 
Level I : Sensory Orienting to Sensorimotor Development 
During the past decade, research has provided compelling evidence of the capacity of infants 
to actively participate in organizing their early experiences. During the 1st month of life, 
this capacity is limited to attending to, but not coordinating, changing stimuli. By 1 month 
of age, infants demonstrate the ability to direct their attention to stimuli, and Case (1991) 
argued that,  between 1 and 4 months, infants begin to form "integrated" models of 
significant caregivers. These models are essentially pat- terns of sensory experiences that 
are affectively laden. A similar notion has been advanced by Meltzoff (1990), who argued 
that infants are equipped to detect patterns of stimulation and to form rudimentary cross-
modal representations of invariance in experience. Even at the most rudimentary level, the 
capacity of infants to detect and orient toward p o s i t i v e  f e a t u r e s  o f  their environment
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(such as feeding and soothing from a caregiver) and away from negative features of their 
environment has obvious adaptive value. This basic capacity gives rise to four basic types of 
psychological experience: (a) pleasure associated with the presence of positive features of the 
environment, (b) distress associated with the absence of these features, (c) distress associated 
with the presence of negative features of the environment, and (d) relief from distress 
associated with the absence of negative features. Increasing affective differentiation (3-4 
months; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) expands the sensitivity of infants in monitoring 
variation in their experiences, particularly with respect to their caregivers. It is unlikely, 
however, that differentiated affect is precisely mirrored in representational structures. Instead, 
experiences are probably represented and integrated across the basic continuum of positivity-
negativity. 
Although relatively simplistic, the integration of experiences along these dimensions 
provides an important affective foundation for the sense of self. Case (1991) has argued that 
experiences linked with positive affect may be more coherently integrated into models than 
experiences linked with negative affect because of the generally disorganizing impact of 
negative affect. Similarly, links between representations of positively and negatively toned 
experiences are likely to be limited. In this sense, although the young infant possesses a 
basic capacity to form preverbal, affectively based, cross-modal representations, these 
probably do not provide an integrated, cohesive representation across the broad range of the 
infant's experiences. 
As infants progress from the early sensorimotor stage (4-8 mo.nths) to the middle and late 
sensorimotor stages (8-18 months), their capacity to initiate and participate in their social 
world increases profoundly. Early in this stage, these attempts consist of "two-component" 
transactions (Case, 1991) wherein infants appear to hold the expectation that their 
behavior (e.g., vocalization and nonverbal expression) will be responded to by their 
caregiver in a complementary fashion. This mode of interaction represents a shift in level of 
representation from the experience of discrete sensory patterns to sensorimotor routines 
(Case, 1991). Building on this level of representational capacity is the subsequent emergence 
of infants' ability to consider two representations: the representation of their experience (e.g., 
experiences of apprehension or fear when confronted with a novel person or object) and 
the representation of the response of their caregiver to this event (e.g., supportive 
encouragement or anxiety and at- tempts to remove the child from danger). By 
referencing new experiences of the world to parental responses, the child can begin to 
venture into the world while relying on the experience and benevolence of his or her parent 
to navigate this voyage. 
Although we are arguing that self-regulatory development is linked to the emergence of 
representational thought, it is important to keep in mind that other factors play an important 
role in self-regulation at this early age. Sroufe (1990) argued that sensitive caregivers provide 
"scaffolding" of self-regulatory developments, particularly early during this period, to 
accommodate the infant's behavior and to bridge developmental transitions. Other researchers 
have used the term "self-regulating other" to describe the attunement of caregivers to infants' 
need for a balance between their emerging capacity to coordinate and represent their 
experiences and the need for caregivers to provide this structure for them (Emde et al., 1991; 
Sander, 1975; Stern, 1985): 
The coherence of experience results from an emotionally available caregiver who is continually 
responsive to a particular active, self-regulating, socially interactive, emotional infant - an infant who is 
"getting it right" in the midst of a particular developmental world that is socially expanding. (Emde et al., 
1991, p. 258) 
 
Thus, although  there  is  value  in  specifying developmental changes in affective, cognitive, 
and social development during infancy, it is misleading to consider the infant and his or her 
capabilities in this regard as the single or appropriate unit of study in self-development. The 
interactive role of the infant-caregiver dyad clearly needs to be considered to understand variants 
in self-regulatory development, particularly during periods when representational capacity is quite 
limited. 
What is known of self-other representation during this period? Early theorists argued that, at 
birth, the infant does not possess even the most rudimentary capacity to distinguish "self" from 
"not-self" experience (Mahler, Pine, & Berg- man, 1975). Mahler (1968) used the term "normal 
autism" to refer to the 1st month of life. She argued that, during this period, the infant is 
unable to recognize others and perceive the functions that they perform for the infant (e.g., 
feeding) as external to the self. Mahler believed that the infant gradually came to differentiate 
between self and others and develop an awareness of self as physically separate from others during 
the 1st year of life. According to Mahler, at approximately 2-3 months of age, infants possess a 
dim recognition of their own bodies and of their mother as being outside of the self. But it is only 
later (5-9 months) that they truly begin to differentiate between self and mother. This 
corresponds to a period of development in which they exhibit stranger anxiety, reflecting their 
recognition of their primary caregivers as distinct familiar others. Mahler's estimates of when 
stranger anxiety occurs correspond quite closely to estimates based on observational research 
(Stern- berg, Campos, & Emde, 1983; Vaughn & Sroufe, 1979). 
The ability of infants to be mobile and to actively explore and manipulate their environment 
(e.g., through crawling or walking) corresponds with a process Mahler termed "hatching." At 
this point, infants (at approximately 10-15 months) appear to be better able to tolerate 
separateness from their mother but will monitor their exploration by referencing back to their 
mother and returning for emotional "refueling" (Mahler, 1968). It is only later (at 
approximately 15-18 months) that infants seem to grasp that their mother exists separately from 
themselves. Mahler (1968) speculated that at this early age, however, infants are not able to 
internally   represent   a coherent   and   stable representation of their mother to comfort them in 
her absence,_ and thus separation typically provokes anxiety and attempts to try to control the 
mother. Research showing that, by the age of 15 months, infants clearly recognize themselves as an 
object (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) complements these psychodynamic notions. 
In summary, during this period of development, infants move from a relatively limited view 
of the self to a point at which the self is experienced and represented as a distinct physical and 
psychological entity separate from others. These early experiences of self are highly interwoven 
in an affective sense and have important consequences for determining the tendency of infants and 
toddlers to approach or avoid others (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). As infants 
begin to differentiate self-experiences from those involving significant others, they begin to 
associate these two modes of experience with positive and negative affective states. As 
illustrated by attachment research , the presence of significant others commonly begins to be 
associated with the presence of positive experiences or relief from negative experiences. 
Insecurely attached infants do not necessarily associate the presence of the caregiver with 
positive outcomes. In cases of maltreatment , infants come to associate the presence of the 
caregiver with negative out- comes and can appear confused and agitated in the presence of the 
caregiver (Carlson, Cicchetti, Barnett , & Braunwald, 1989). Early patterns of approach-
avoidance behavior show at least some degree of stability over the preschool period (e.g., 
Main & Cassidy, 1988), supporting the notion that early affective foundations of self-
representation have important implications for later development. 
As infants develop a sense of themselves as distinct agents with interests and desires, they also 
begin to form an affective sense of self. Theorists from diverse perspectives have argued that the 
manner in which significant others respond to infants' explorations , interest, and growing 
capabilities influences the affective foundations of the self. If caregivers respond in ways that 
enhance self-experiences by providing optimal conditions for self-exploration (Winnicott, 1965' ), 
"prizing" the infant (Rogers, 1961), and soothing anxiety and fears (Kohut, 1971), infants are 
likely to form a well- integrated,   positively   toned   base  for  self- development. In contrast, 
if caregivers respond in ways that limit, frustrate, or overwhelm the emerging self of a child, 
these situations are likely to give rise to a less positive or a negative sense of self. Sullivan 
(1953) argued that overly harsh or anxiety-provoking parental responses have a profoundly 
negative impact on the integration of experiences into the self-system, particularly when this 
occurs at early preverbal stages of development. 
In summary, although research specifically examining self-other differentiation and 
representation during this developmental period is limited, the findings that have emerged are 
consistent with classic and more recent theories of self-development; both identify the 
emergence of a fundamental affective foundation for the self and the ability to form 
generalized representations of invariance in experience as important features of this 
developmental period. These developments, however, do not support sophisticated self-regulatory 
action. At this level of development, infants are not capable of forming representations of the 
relation between specific self-attributes or behaviors and positive or negative experiences. Nor 
are  they able  to simultaneously represent the relation between their specific self-attributes and 
the attributes desired by others and the consequences of this relation . Nonetheless, even though 
the complexity of their representations  does  not  allow infants to regulate their behavior in 
terms of set goals or self-guides, these representations reflect the affective tone of self-other 
experiences and have important repercussions in determining approach and avoidance 
orientations. 
 
Level 2: Early Interrelational Development 
A shift in representational capacity occurs with the emergence of symbolic representational 
abilities between the ages of 18 months and 2 years (Bruner, 1964; Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980; 
Piaget, 1951; Werner & Kaplan, 1963). This shift (interrelational period, Substage 1, 18 months 
to 2 years of age; Case, 1991) corresponds with the emergence of language and is associated 
with the ability to consider bidirectional relationships between objects, including self-as-object 
and other-as-object. As toddlers move through this level of development (interrelational period, 
Substage 2, 2-3.5 years of age), they acquire an increasingly complex and more well-
integrated understanding of their role and the roles of others in social systems (Case, 1991). 
For example, children begin to under- stand the relation between their behavior and the 
responses of others. Moreover, they can include the impact of others' responses to them in 
this representational sequence. Thus, they can under- stand that when they behave in a particular 
way, their mother or father responds in a predictable manner that then leads them to experience 
a positive or negative psychological state (Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic, 1992). In other 
words, children now understand and represent the interpersonal significance of their behavior 
and the implications of this for their psychological well being. These self-other contingency 
beliefs reflect their understanding of social rules and relations and are used to regulate 
behavior. As such, these early belief structures are the foundations of a "moral self" that  
allows toddlers to begin to regulate their own behavior in terms of an internal set of beliefs 
concerning what is and what is not acceptable (Emde et al., 1991). 
It is important to note that, in contrast to the previous level of development, children at 
this level of development are able to differentiate between self and others much more 
fully. They are now able to identify themselves as unique physical objects (Schneider-
Rosen & Cicchetti, 1984, 1991), and they recognize their names and distinguish themselves 
from other children. In addition, they begin to apply concrete categorical descriptions to the 
self (e.g., gender, specific interests, and physical abilities; Harter, 1983). Children also 
enter into a period of tremendous growth in their ability to negotiate the world physically 
and psychologically. These developments contribute to an emerging sense of the self as 
distinct and with intention (i.e., to a sense of "I"). 
Psychodynamic theorists maintain that the emergence of a distinct sense of self is a critical 
period of self-development. Children begin to express the desire to exert personal control in 
their lives, and their success or frustration in this regard becomes linked with their self-esteem. 
They often overestimate their abilities in ways that can appear to be unrealistic and 
grandiose (Kohut, 1971; Kohut & Wolf, 1992). This corresponds with a period of self-
assertion (Sander, 1975), ambivalence about separation, and a "battle of the wills" (Mahler,  
1968). The tendency of young children to overestimate their abilities may be due, in part, to 
their limited capacity to gauge the relative level of their abilities through processes such as 
social comparison. Object relations and self-psychology theorists argue, however, that the 
inflated or idealized images of self and other that emerge during this period of development 
reflect a critical phase in the development of a "core self." Furthermore, they suggest that 
parents play a pivotal role in the child's emerging sense of self-esteem by providing 
reflections - or "mirroring" - of the child's growing competencies. Effective parents have 
empathy for their child's need to experience herself or himself as powerful and effective, 
despite the child's obvious dependency and powerlessness. Parental responses that support 
the child's view of herself or himself as powerful contribute to the child's motivation to go 
forward and meet new challenges. With this foundation in place, children are better able to 
integrate later, developmentally appropriate challenges that help them come to terms with 
real limitations in themselves and others (Kohut, 1971; Kohut & Wolf, 1992). If all goes 
well during this process, children will gradually begin to accept positive and negative aspects 
of the self and others and internalize self-regulatory functions related to self-esteem 
maintenance. 
Kohut and his colleagues (Kohut, 1971; Kohut & Wolf, 1992) also emphasized the need of 
young children to idealize others as powerful in controlling the world and ensuring safety. 
Kohut hypothesized that by experiencing parents as powerful, competent, and able to assuage 
fears, children themselves gradually begin to internalize these "self-functions" and develop 
competency. As child competence grows, effective parents present their children with 
increasingly challenging but developmentally appropriate opportunities to assume more 
responsibility for self-regulation. 
Thus, according to  object relations and self psychology, effective parenting supports and 
encourages the emergence of healthy self- esteem and a positive but balanced view of the self 
and significant others. The emergence of healthy self-other representations is predicated on 
reciprocal transactions between child and parent that ensure consolidation but also encourage 
developmentally appropriate growth. Traditional psychodynamic theories link pathological self-
other representations to inadequate experiences within the child-parent relationship. For 
example, self psychology suggests that some parents are limited in their ability to understand 
and accept the grandiose or idealizing needs of their children. These parents may be 
threatened by their children's growing competence, preoccupied with their own needs, 
overwhelmed by the intensity of their children's needs, or fearful of being overindulgent. When 
parents are limited in this regard, opportunities for experiences of the self or others as 
competent and pleasurable within a relational context are limited, and an internal sense of 
self-esteem is not well established. It is argued that, as a result, these children display intense 
and developmentally inappropriate needs to be admired, praised, and calmed by others and that 
they are intolerant of minor disappointments and failures and exhibit wide fluctuations in their 
perceptions of self-worth and esteem for others. 
Most developmental theories would accept that parental sensitivity to the emergence of new 
modes of experience and expression in young children is critical to the parent-child partner- 
ship in the development of self-regulatory competence. Parents who are sensitive and attuned to 
their child's emerging abilities and emotional needs will be more likely to success- fully 
negotiate and communicate expectations that permit children to appropriately express their 
needs and their emotional experiences. Expectations that are consistent with the competencies 
of young children and help to bridge them to more independent forms of self-regulation will be 
most beneficial in providing a healthy context for the expression of inner experiences and 
exploratory interests. This partnership between parent and child regarding self-other 
relationships and social scripts provides a structure for the child to internalize and allows him 
or her to successfully negotiate the child-parent relationship and subsequent social 
relationships. 
The emergence of symbolic representational skills, coupled with the emergence of a "core 
self," makes this a critical period for the development of self-other representations. Building on 
the foundations of basic approach- avoidance orientations to self and others established during 
the previous developmental level, this period of development is probably related to the 
emergence of more specific beliefs about the attributes of the self, a self that either possesses or 
lacks valued attributes. Children now have a greater understanding of how others respond to 
self attributes and an understanding of the impact of others' responses on their own emotional 
state. With these rather concrete representations now in place, children can consider the 
relation among the representations and begin to regulate themselves in more sophisticated ways 
than simply orienting toward or away from others. 
 
 
Level 3: Late Interrelational and Early Dimensional Development 
 
Between the ages of 4 and 6 years, the representational capacity of  children  increases so 
that they are able to infer the perspectives of others on a particular event or object, including 
the self (Case, 1985, 1991; Feffer, 1970; Fischer, 1980; Higgins, 1981; Piaget, 1965). In contrast 
to the previous level of development, children can now infer another person's viewpoint on the 
self. Thus, children at this level can understand that it is the discrepancy between their actual 
behavior and the behavior desired by their parents that underlies their parents' response to them. 
These self-other contingency beliefs underlie children's belief that if they are able to display the 
behavior that they infer their parents desire, their parents will respond positively to them. This 
permits children to monitor their behavior in relation to the guides of significant others (i.e., 
other standpoints) and to engage in self-regulation to maximize positive (or minimize negative) 
consequences for the self. Once again, the sensitivity of parents to the needs and competencies 
of their children and their partner- ship with their children are an important cornerstone in 
determining the nature and clarity of early self-other contingency beliefs. Parents who negotiate 
and clearly communicate expectations to their children that are congruent with their needs and 
competencies will be most successful in providing optimal conditions for the internalization of 
effective and adaptive internal regulatory structures. 
At this level of cognitive development, children also begin to represent other standards for 
self-evaluation. They can compare their performance with that of others (social comparison) or 
with their own performance in the past (autobiographical standards; Ruble & Rholes, 1981; 
Shantz, 198 3). These new standards for self-evaluation become a source of ideals and goals that 
can be adopted as one's own self-guides. For example, children may observe the performance 
of admired others (e.g., peer, older sibling, or sports personality) and may adopt this level of 
performance as a guide for the self. Thus, at this level of development, children can evaluate 
their behavior or attributes with respect to a multitude of self-guides, each giving rise to a 
particular psychological outcome. 
Other changes begin to occur in the type and stability of characteristics ascribed to the self. 
Whereas children at lower levels of cognitive development tend to describe themselves in 
highly specific behavioral terms and may vary considerably in their self-descriptions on 
various occasions, children at this level of development begin to describe the self in more 
generalized terms (Harter, 1983). Nonetheless, they are unable to integrate opposing attributes 
into higher order generalizations about the self (Case, 1985; Ruble & Dweck, 1995). Thus, the 
generalized descriptions used by children at this age are not equivalent to trait descriptions 
used by older children in providing an integrative function. In other words, children are 
cognitively mature enough to understand that patterns of behaviors and feelings represent more 
generalized characteristics about the self but not sophisticated enough to understand that 
conflicting aspects of behavior and feelings can be integrated within the same person. Children  
at this age also struggle to integrate opposing characteristics of the inferred standpoints of 
others on the self. Thus, their feelings about themselves, both from their own perspective and 
from the inferred perspective of others, fluctuate considerably. 
The developments that occur during this period are clearly built on the foundations of earlier 
periods. This period, however, marks the emergence of explicit representations of the 
viewpoints that others hold toward the self (i.e., other standpoints). As such, the capacity of 
children to regulate themselves on the basis of a clearly articulated understanding of their 
social context increases significantly. The emotional tone (positive or negative) and 
motivational orientation that have become associated with the self and others at earlier 
developmental  levels continue to have a powerful impact on the experience of the self at this 
developmental level and are now explicitly represented in self-other contingency beliefs. 
These beliefs, in turn, have affective repercussions for children. Self-other contingency  beliefs,  
for  example, that emphasize a lack of acceptance by parents will have a negative impact  on 
self-esteem (Harter, Marold, & Whitesell, 1992). The negative affect that is produced by this 
type of self-other contingency belief has a disorganizing impact on children and thus may also 
impair their capacity to integrate self-other experiences. This issue becomes increasingly  
critical in later stages of development when conflicting and sometimes threatening aspects of 
the self must be integrated. In contrast, self-other contingency beliefs that emphasize  
acceptance by parents are likely to give rise to positive self-esteem and to ease the transition 
into subsequent periods of development. 
 
 
Level 4: Late Dimensional Development 
 
At this level of development, between the ages of 9 and 11 years, a significant shift in 
representational capacity occurs, giving rise to the ability to simultaneously represent and 
compare rankings on more than one dimension at one time. Children, for example, can 
recognize that although their performance has improved in comparison with their past 
performance, it is still not as good as that of their peers. The ability of children to consider 
multiple dimensions in evaluating their behavior allows them to reach increasingly stable and 
dispositional conclusions about the self. Social comparison information becomes especially 
salient in self-evaluation (Damon & Hart, 1988), introducing the risk of forming negative 
dispositional conclusions about the self (Renick & Harter,  1989). 
The ability of children at this level of development to think about the self in dispositional 
terms and the increased stability in self-representation that this brings can make self-regulation 
even more challenging. Whereas before this level of development children could assume that 
simply changing a behavior would allow them to meet a standard they held for themselves or 
one they believed others held for them, this is no longer the case. Now  children's self-other 
beliefs can represent the ways in which their peronal dispositions do not meet important 
standards, and this produces a psycho- logically distressing and difficult problem to solve. 
The growing complexity of the  self-evaluative system, along with the increasing potential for 
conflict within this system, sets the stage for the final level of development, in which 
adolescents begin to struggle with  differentiating among the self-guides that will be retained as 
part of their own self-guide system  (i.e., their own values, goals, and morals), the other 
standpoint self-guides that will  be  retained  as the "felt presences of others" (Schafer, 1968), 
and the self-guides that will be rejected. 
 
Level 5: Vectorial Development 
 
Adolescence ( 13to 16 years of age) brings the capacity to simultaneously consider several 
perspectives on multiple events or attributes, interrelating different dimensional systems (Case, 
1985; Fischer, 1980; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Selman & Byrne, 1974). Adolescents form 
increasingly abstract generalized perceptions of themselves and others based on their 
consideration of multiple attributes. Most important, they can now simultaneously compare 
their own evaluation of these attributes with the evaluations that they believe others hold (e.g., 
their parents vs. their peers). This level of cognitive sophistication allows adolescents to 
consider simultaneously the relation of their actual-self attributes to several self-guides (e.g., 
own self-guides, parental self-guides, self-guides of peers, and cultural norms) and the relation 
of these self-guides to each other. Furthermore, adolescents can speculate about the self- 
representational structure of others: the types of attributes that others possess, would like to 
possess, and so on. They can understand, for example, that an athlete who possesses 
outstanding abilities feels disappointed when she fails to make an Olympic team because her 
actual abilities are discrepant from her goals. The capacity of adolescents to represent these 
self-regulatory scenarios provides them with the opportunity to imagine and act out alternative 
images for the self and consider the consequences of possessing various personas. 
The complexity of representational thought at this level of development greatly increases  
the complexity of information about the self and the likelihood  of discrepancy  among  various  
self-states. Adolescents are now confronted with the task of integrating multiple views of 
themselves in different and often changing social contexts (e.g., family, peer, romantic, and 
work contexts). As they move through the period of adolescence and enter into early adulthood, 
they are increasingly concerned with the views that others hold of them, particularly  their  
peers  and romantic partners. Primary attachments to romantic partners and  close  friends  
emerge  and  must  be balanced with attachment to parents and family members.  They are 
strongly  motivated  to gain the acceptance of others and may attempt to do so by presenting 
themselves  "falsely," that is, as possessing attributes or beliefs that are not their own  but   are  
designed  to  impress  others  or conceal attributes they believe are not accepted by others 
(Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, 1996). 
The capacity of adolescents to simultaneously consider multiple perspectives on the self, 
coupled with the challenge of significant changes in their social relationships, provokes a period 
of intense self-preoccupation and pressure to consolidate a sense of self. Ego psychologists 
(Eagle, 1984; Erikson, 1963, 1968; Marcia, 1987) have extensively discussed the process of 
identity development that ensues during this developmental period. From a social-cognitive 
perspective identity crisis is precipitated by the representational capacity to consider 
simultaneously multiple discrepant perspectives on the self. Early during this period, 
adolescents will have the capacity to be aware of multiple  and possibly conflicting views of 
the self, but their ability to integrate divergent views will be somewhat limited. Itis not until 
late adolescence that the ability to integrate apparent contradictions in self-attributes develops 
(Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & Whitesell, 1997; Harter & Mon- sour, 1992). Similarly, it is 
unlikely that opposing views of the self held by different individuals (e.g., self, parents, and 
peers) can be successfully integrated and accepted until the period of late adolescence. 
If consolidation of the self-system and the adoption of a coherent set of self-guides are overly 
conflicted, adolescents find themselves in an extended period of crisis and confusion regarding 
their identity (identity moratorium). This may occur because the cognitive demands of 
integration are simply too overwhelming. It is equally likely, however, that the emotional 
consequences of acute levels of discrepancy hinder adolescents from applying the cognitive 
skills that they do possess to integrate conflicting material. In some cases, adolescents may 
simply avoid the conflict inherent in considering multiple possibilities for self-definition 
(identity diffusion) or circumvent this crisis through the indiscriminate adoption of parental or 
socially prescribed self-guides  (identity  foreclosure). For adolescents who enter this period 
with only a moderate discrepancy between self-state representations, the process of identity 
consolidation can be a gratifying period of self- exploration and definition (identity 
achievement). The success of adolescents in negotiating this period of development will again 
depend on the sensitivity and support of their caregivers in providing scaffolding for higher 
levels of functioning. In particular, caregivers need to provide support and opportunities for 
individuation and appropriately assist  adolescents  with the task of integrating conflicting 
information about the self. 
It is important to understand that although adolescence marks a period during which the 
crystallization of identity may occur, identity formation is by no means restricted to this 
developmental period. Erikson (1963, 1968) explicitly discussed this developmental stage as a 
critical one in an ongoing process of self-construction that extends from birth across the life 
span. Similarly, own and other self-guides have been forming well before this period of 
development and undergo further transformation during subsequent developmental periods. 
We have discussed the emergence of own and other self-regulatory guides as a function of 
developments in cognitive representational capacity in general and  self-state representations in 
particular. In our description of this process, we have assumed equal development of both types 
of self-regulatory standpoints on self. Individuals may differ, however, in the extent to which 
they regulate in relation to their own self-guides versus the inferred guides of significant 
others. In the next section, we consider the development of such individual differences in self-
regulatory orientation. 
 
 
Individual Differences in Standpoint Orientation 
The factors that determine the acquisition of knowledge in general also influence the development 
of self-regulatory guides. The coherence of self-other contingency knowledge and other standpoint 
guides is determined by the frequency, consistency, clarity, and significance with which parents 
communicate information regarding the relation of children's behaviors to parental responses 
(Higgins, 1989a, 1991; Moretti & Higgins, 1990a). When parents frequently and consistently draw 
attention to the relation between their child's behavior and specific consequences, and they do 
so in a way  that highlights the distinctiveness of this relation, they are likely to produce self-
other contingency beliefs in their child that are highly accessible and likely to produce uniform 
and coherent self-regulation. To the extent that children are motivated to meet parental guides 
because the consequences of meeting or not meeting these guides are important for them, they 
will be inclined to view their parents' communication of contingency information as highly 
significant. 
Parents engage in varying types of socialization strategies that increase or decrease the 
likelihood of their children developing and internalizing coherent self-regulatory guides. For 
example, a child whose parents are consistently responsive and sensitive in monitoring the child's 
behavior and who use induction techniques (i.e., explaining rules clearly and providing reasons 
for consequences) is likely to develop and internalize coherent self-other contingency beliefs. In 
contrast, a child whose parents tend to be inconsistent, overcontrolling, and harsh (e.g., restrictive 
and punitive) or undercontrolling and too permissive (e.g., neglectful) is not likely to develop or 
internalize coherent self-other contingency beliefs (see Higgins, 1989a, 1991; Moretti & 
Higgins, 1990a). 
In socializing their children, parents may focus their attention on different types of 
psychological situations. For example, parents may focus on situations in which their child's 
behavior matches the standards that they hold for their child or they may focus on situations in 
which their  child's behavior  does not  match standards. Meeting parental standards may result 
in the child experiencing either the presence of a positive outcome (e.g., praise or affection) or 
the absence of a negative outcome (e.g., avoiding criticism or rejection). Failing to meet parental 
standards may result in the child experiencing either the presence of negative outcomes (e.g., 
punishment) or the absence of positive outcomes (e.g., love withdrawal). In this way, parental 
socialization practices may lead to the development of self-regulatory styles that focus on the 
presence or absence of either positive outcomes (promotion focus) or negative outcomes 
(prevention focus; see Higgins, 1996a). 
Parents also play a pivotal role in socializing their children to regulate their behavior with 
respect to their own self-guides or the inferred self-guides of significant others. Parents vary in 
the extent to which they socialize their children to attend to others' emotions and to engage in 
behavior that meets the demands or needs of others (Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chap- 
man, 1983). When parents socialize their children to have empathy for the emotional states of 
others and to engage in behavior that attends to the needs and desires of others, children are 
likely to develop a self-regulatory style that is oriented toward the inferred guides of others for 
the self. In contrast, when parents socialize their children to value independence, autonomy, and 
individual initiative, they are likely to develop a self-regulatory style that is oriented toward their 
own self-guides. 
 
 
Sex Differences  in Standpoint Orientation 
Own versus other socialization practices may also be important in understanding self- 
regulatory differences between males and fe- males (see also Higgins, 1991). Research on 
differences in male and female socialization indicates that parents monitor the behavior of their 
daughters more than that of their sons (see Block, 1983; Fagot, 1978; Huston, 1983; Parke & 
Slaby, 1983; Radke-Yarrow et al., 1983; Rothbart & Maccoby,  1966; Rothbart & Roth- bart, 
1976). Females are encouraged to attend to others' needs, o conform to their expectations, and to 
judge their success or failure in terms of acceptance by others (Cross & Madson, 1997). This 
pattern of socialization has obvious deleterious consequences for self-esteem and predisposes 
girls to depression in adolescence (Nolen- Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994). For example, Pomerantz 
and Ruble (1998a, 1998b) have shown that although mothers are equally likely to use control 
with their daughters and their sons, they are more likely to use control without granting 
autonomy with their daughters than their sons. They also found that the use of control without 
granting autonomy increases the extent to which children accept  responsibility for failure. 
Thus, it is the difference in the meaning of control tactics for autonomous self-regulation, 
rather than the use of control per se, that contributes to the deleterious effect of female sex-
typed socialization (Pomerantz & Ruble, 1998a, 1998b; Pomerantz & Saxon, in press). 
As a consequence of distinct socialization experiences, girls and boys may develop differ- 
ent standpoint orientations. To the extent that socialization is sex typed, girls are likely to 
develop an orientation toward "relational self-regulation": the tendency to construct a self in 
relation to others (Gilligan, Lyons, & Hammer, 1990; Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver, & 
Surrey, 1991; Surrey, 1991) and to self-regulate to the standards that significant others hold for 
the self. This self-regulatory style may be a function of the lower social status and power of 
women in our society, thus increasing their motivation to be sensitive to the perspectives that 
others hold, particularly others who exert control and power (Martin & Ruble, 1997). In 
contrast, sex-typed socialization practices encourage boys to develop an orientation to regulate 
toward standards that are independent of intimate relation- ships (Baumeister & Sommer, 
1997). This prediction is supported by a broad range of research on gender differences in 
socialization (Cross & Madson, 1997), particularly research on parental socialization of 
emotional attunement and empathy in sons and daughters. Mothers are more likely to discuss 
others' feelings with their young daughters than their sons (Parke, 1967), and by 2 years of age 
girls are more likely to talk about feelings than are boys (Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987). 
Parents also encourage their daughters, more than their sons, to attend to others' feelings by 
using induction techniques that help them understand the impact of their behavior on others 
(Grusec,  Dix,  & Mills,  1982; Smetana, 1989). Consequently, girls are more likely than boys 
to anticipate_ feeling badly if they act aggressively toward others and to express concern 
about the impact of their aggressive behavior on others (Boldizar, Perry, & Perry, 1989; Perry, 
Perry, & Weiss, 1989). 
The view that women are socialized to attend to others' standards for them is consistent 
with theories that stress the relational context in which females develop a sense of self. 
Accord- ing to Miller (1976), women tend to define and experience themselves in terms of 
their relation- ships with others. Chodorow (1978) suggested that this occurs because 
female self-development occurs within a context that emphasizes relatedness to others, 
particularly mothers, whereas male self-development emphasizes independence, autonomy, 
and differentiation from others. 
In summary, both significant, close relation- ships and the larger social context shape the 
developing self. As a result of these forces, individuals may differ in the extent to which 
own versus other perspectives on the self are psychologically relevant for self-regulation. 
Individual differences may emerge in (a) the level of discrepancy between own and other 
standpoints on the self and (b) the psychological relevance of own versus other standpoint 
perspectives for self-regulation. We now turn to a review of recent studies we have 
completed that examine standpoint orientation and sensitivity to interpersonal feedback. We 
also present findings on sex differences in standpoint orientation and their implications for 
understanding sex differences in dysphoria. 
 
Own Versus Other Discrepancy and Sensitivity to Interpersonal  Feedback 
 
Individual differences in own versus other regulatory orientation should have consequences for 
sensitivity and responsiveness to interpersonal feedback. In one study, we examined whether 
the impact of receiving negative feedback from others was different for individuals who were 
predominantly focused on issues of "own" self-regulation versus "other" self- regulation 
(Moretti, Higgins, Woody, & Leung, 1998). Approximately 400 participants were screened via 
the Selves Questionnaire to identify those who had uniquely high actual-own self-discrepancy   
("own  standpoint  regulators") or high actual-other self-discrepancy ("other standpoint 
regulators"). In a subsequent experimental session, participants were led to believe that an 
observer was evaluating them from behind a one-way mirror. They were asked to provide a 
brief description of themselves and were then provided with feedback regarding their 
personality that presumably came from the observer. In actual fact, experimental participants 
received negative feedback that specifically targeted a self-discrepancy based on their earlier 
responses to the Selves Questionnaire (self-relevant negative feedback). Yoked control 
participants received negative feedback that was drawn from the earlier responses of other 
participants but was unrelated to their own responses on the questionnaire. Affect was measured 
before feedback, immediately after feedback, immediately after debriefing, and the following 
day. 
We predicted that individual differences in sensitivity to feedback would not be detected either 
immediately after feedback or immediately after debriefing because the strong and unambiguous 
valence of the information at these two points in time (i.e., highly negative feedback and highly 
positive impact of debriefing) would momentarily override any individual differences in 
sensitivity to feedback. Individual differences in the impact of feedback were predicted to occur 
at the 1-day follow-up because the self-relevant negative feedback should increase the  
accessibility of self-discrepancies. More specifically, we predicted that, in comparison with 
"own" self-regulators, "other" self-regulators who received self- relevant feedback would show 
high levels of negative mood at follow-up. As predicted, all participants reported comparable 
significant increases in negative affect after initial feedback and decreases in negative affect after 
debriefing. At follow-up, however, only participants with high actual-self-other self-discrepancies  
who had received self-relevant feedback reported significant increases in negative affect. In 
fact, these participants reported levels of distress at follow-up that were comparable to their 
distress when they initially received negative feedback. These results show that the long-term 
impact of social feedback is determined by the self-relevance of the feedback and the sensitivity 
of individuals to others' standpoints on the self. 
As we noted earlier, there is a tendency for females to be more strongly socialized than 
males to attend to the standpoints of intimate others on the self (Cross & Madson, 1997). As a 
result, females tend to experience more distress than males when they perceive their actual 
self as discrepant from the standards that intimate others hold for  them, and they may seek 
congruency with others' standards at the price of discrepancy with their own standards for  the 
self. This does not necessarily imply, however, that females will be any less distressed than 
males when they perceive their actual self as discrepant from their own self-guides. Thus, 
females may suffer from distress when they believe that they do not meet others' standards 
as well as when they believe they do not meet their own standards. In contrast, males may 
suffer only when they believe that they do not meet their own standards. The self-regulatory 
significance of others' standards for the self may contribute to the greater proclivity of females 
to develop depression (see also Higgins, 1991). 
In a recent study (Moretti, Rein, & Wiebe, 1998), we examined the unique relationships 
of actual-own-ideal and actual-other-ideal self-discrepancy and dysphoria in undergraduate 
women and men. Women showed significantly higher levels of discrepancy between the 
actual self and their own ideal standards than between their actual self and the ideal 
standards that parents and close friends held for them. This finding suggests that women 
seek congruency with others' standards for the self at the price of discrepancy with their 
own self-guides. In contrast, men showed equivalent levels of actual-own-ideal and 
actual-other-ideal self- discrepancy. As predicted, actual-own-ideal self-discrepancy was 
associated with higher levels of dysphoria in both men and women, but actual-other-ideal 
self-discrepancy was associated with higher dysphoria only in women. These results suggest 
that women may be more at risk for dysphoria and depression than are men because 
women also regulate toward others' standards for the self. As a consequence of "relational 
self-regulation”, individuals may fail to clearly  identify and pursue  their own goals, thus 
reducing important opportunities to experience the self as successful and competent. 
Relational self-regulators may also undervalue real successes in relation to their own independent 
goals because their regulatory focus is on standards and goals that are shared between self and 
others. In addition, their self-worth will be dependent on their perceptions of approval by others, 
and they may become preoccupied with how to construct themselves to ensure this approval. 
Additional support for sex differences in regulatory orientation is provided from a recent study 
in which we examined the impact of priming own versus others' standpoints on the self (Vlassev, 
Moretti, & Roney, 1998). Participants completed the Selves Questionnaire to determine baseline 
levels of actual-own self- guide and actual-parent self-guide "related- ness," that is, the total 
number of congruent and discrepant attributes between the actual self and own versus parent guides. 
Four weeks later they returned and were asked to write a short paragraph describing their own 
goals, wishes, and aspirations (own priming) or the goals that their parents held for them (other 
priming). After priming, participants listed attributes describing their actual self. Our dependent 
measure was the degree of change in relatedness between the actual self and own versus parent 
guides from baseline to priming. As predicted, priming parental guides led females to construct 
their actual self in terms that emphasized the degree of relatedness between the actual self and 
parental standpoints. Priming parental standards did not have this impact on males. This finding 
suggests that females are sensitive to parental standards and that thinking about these stan- 
dards has at least a temporary impact on how they view their actual self, but this was not the 
case for males. Priming own standards led males to construct  their  actual  self  in  terms  that 
-emphasized the degree of relatedness between the actual self and their personal standards. This 
effect was not observed for females. 
These results offer support for the notion that others' standpoints on the self are particularly 
accessible for women and play an important role in their self-regulation. For men, their own 
standpoint on the self is the important standard of self-regulation. It is important to keep in mind 
that the differences that emerged between males and females probably depend on socialization 
experiences that fit traditional sex-typed patterns (Siegal,   1987).  In  other  words,  it  is 
important to view this self-regulatory difference as an individual difference related to socialization 
experiences rather than a sex difference per se; clearly, there are women who predominantly 
regulate toward their own independent standards and men who regulate toward the standards of 
significant others. 
As previously noted, there are costs and benefits of each of these self-regulatory styles. 
Individuals who chronically regulate in relation to the guides of significant others run the risk of 
experiencing psychological distress and low self-esteem if there are losses or disruptions in their 
interpersonal relationships. Consequently, they may be vulnerable to periods of depression or 
anxiety, depending on whether they suffer from actual-other-ideal or actual-other-ought 
discrepancies . They may also sacrifice or fail to attend to achieving their own goals because they 
are overly focused on the standards that they believe others hold for them. This can reduce 
important opportunities for experiencing the self as successful and competent, thus reducing the 
feelings of personal self-esteem that can buffer one from interpersonal losses. Downey and her 
colleagues (Downey & Feldman, 1996; Downey, Khouri, & Feldman, 1997) have suggested that 
children exposed to maltreatment develop a cognitive-affective predisposition to expect, 
perceive, and overreact to potential rejection in interpersonal relationships. Individuals with high 
levels of "rejection sensitivity" are more likely to perceive intentional rejection in ambiguous 
interpersonal situations, and  they act in ways that decrease relationship satisfaction and partner 
support  (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Our work suggests that the tendency toward rejection 
sensitivity may be a function of chronically accessible actual-other discrepancies, that is, an 
underlying self-other representational structure that is consistent with the belief that one does not 
possess, and perhaps can never possess, the characteristics that are essential in securing consistent 
acceptance and support from others. 
In contrast , individuals who chronically regulate toward their own self-guides may run the 
risk of placing too much value on achieving their own goals. If they fail to achieve at a level 
commensurate with their standards, this will have negative consequences for their sense of 
personal self-esteem. To the extent that they are overly focused on their own standpoint, they 
may fail to attend to the standpoints that others hold for them. This may take a toll on the 
intimacy and support that they are able to derive from relationships. Placing a high value on 
personal achievement in our society, however, tends not to be associated with depression. 
It may become a greater vulnerability at a point in life at which achievements begin to lose 
their glow or when there is significant disruption in achievements (e.g., loss of a job, 
demotion, downsizing, or displacement). We tum next to a more in-depth examination of self-
regulatory differences in standpoint orientation, and the case of overlapping standpoints, by 
revisiting the classic psychological process of internalization. 
 
Standpoint Orientation and the Process of Internalization 
For most individuals, both their own and others' standards for the self are relevant for self-
regulation. Although we have  discussed own and other standpoints on the self as if they are 
independent of each other, there can be substantial overlap between them. As we discussed 
earlier, own and other standpoints on the self are interwoven through development, and the 
degree of overlap between these two standpoints on the self varies between individuals. 
Psychodynamic theories of internalization offer an understanding of the process by which own 
and other standpoints are integrated in self-regulation. Although different definitions of 
internalization have been proposed, there is general agreement that this process involves the 
gradual transformation of regulatory functions provided by significant others and society into 
inner self-regulatory mechanisms (Blatt & Behrends, 1987; Hartmann, Kris, & Lowenstein,   
1946; Meissner,   1980, 1981;  Schafer, 1968). According  to  Schafer  (1968),  "internalization 
refers to all those processes by which the subject transforms  real or imagined regulatory 
interactions  with  his  environment,  and real  or imagined   characteristics   of   his   
environment, into inner regulations and characteristics" (p. 9). Psychodynamic and object 
relations theorists conceptualize internalization as a lifelong process that is  expressed   
differently   at  various points in development (Blatt & Behrends, 1987; Meissner, 1981). In its 
earliest form, internalization is based on little or no self-other differentiation. This form of 
internalization is sometimes referred to as "incorporation" (Schafer, 1968; Meissner, 198t), a 
process by which "object representations completely lose their object character and are merged 
or fused with self-representations without distinction" (Meissner, 1981, p. 18). This form of 
internalization is believed to be characteristic of infants and very young children. Incorporation 
is also believed to be characteristic of cases of extreme personality disorder (e.g., severe 
borderline personality disorder) in which individuals experience great difficulty in maintaining 
their sense of self in relationships. 
With greater psychological maturation, regulatory functions are identified as being outside of 
the self (e.g., parental). These functions may be taken into the  self,  or  "introjected," in  an 
attempt   to   provide   inner   regulation.   Even though   this   process   leads  to   self-
regulatory functions being adopted from others and taken into  the  self,  these  functions  
continue  to  be experienced  as  the  "felt  presences  of  others" (Sandler & Rosenblatt,  1962; 
Schafer, 1968). In contrast to incorporation and introjection, which involve taking in regulatory 
or other functions provided   by others,   "identification"  involves the  restructuring  of  
preexisting  self-regulatory guides and structures. Through this restructuring process, some 
aspects of self-regulation begin to be   adopted   or identified   as   one's   own.   In contrast to 
introjection, identification marks the transformation of external regulatory guides to self-guides 
that are now accepted as one's own. Development  is conceptualized as a dynamic process  
involving both  introjection  (the taking in  of  regulatory   functions  from  others)  and 
identification  (the restructuring  and refinement of internal self-regulatory  structures). Although 
this process is not restricted to childhood (Blatt & Behrends, 1987), there may be critical 
developmental periods during which individuals are particularly receptive to external influences 
(e.g., early development) or particularly challenged by the need to develop new or more mature 
forms of self-regulation (e.g., social role changes associated with adolescence and early 
adulthood). As the self becomes reorganized and self-regulatory guides are adopted as one's 
own, the capacity r inner regulation increases and dependence 'on the environment for 
self-regulation decreases (Hartmann et al., 1946). Thus, the internalization of self-regulatory 
mechanisms is an adaptive developmental process that ensures effective self-regulation across 
varying environments and life crises. 
Developmental research has also examined the impact of parental socialization practices 
on internalization. This work is based on a more general definition of internalization as 
taking over the values and attitudes of society as one's own so that socially acceptable 
behavior is motivated by intrinsic or internal factors rather than the anticipation of external 
consequences (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994). Deci and Ryan's (1987) work has been helpful in 
identifying the parental and other socialization conditions that facilitate internalization. They 
have argued that internalization and identification are more likely to occur when socialization 
is oriented toward supporting autonomy rather than instituting control. For example, 
Grolnick and Ryan (1989) found that autonomous self-regulation in children was related to 
parental autonomy support, that is, parental encouragement and support of participation in 
decision making and independent problem solving. From their perspective, autonomy is 
most likely to be achieved when parents allow children to move toward independence in 
self-regulation within a secure and supportive relationship. As Ryan and Lynch (1989) 
pointed out, the process of achieving autonomy is facilitated  by secure attachment rather 
than detachment from parents: "Individuation is not something that happens from parents but 
rather with them" (p. 341). 
Internalization is clearly an important psycho- logical process and a cornerstone of self- 
development. Yet, there has been little research that specifically examines the  assumptions 
about the internalization process. Do the hypothesized differences between identified and intro- 
jected guides have self-regulatory consequences?   One   would   predict   that   identified 
.self-guides  would  have  an especially  powerful impact on self-regulation because they 
represent a  "shared  reality"  (Hardin  & Higgins,  1996; Higgins, 1996a) about the self with 
significant others; the regulatory guides that were once external to the self and held by 
significant others are now also accepted as one's own. When one perceives one's behavior 
or performance as discrepant from a shared reality about one's goals and standards, it is  
difficult to escape feeling negatively about oneself. One may attempt to alter one's 
interpretation of one's behavior,  consider  the  context  in  which  it occurred,  and  so  
on,  but  it  is  difficult  to disregard  a  self-guide  that  one  shares  with significant others 
and holds central to who one is and what  one believes in. Thus, discrepancy with  
identified  self-guides  can  produce  extremely negative psychological consequences, but 
congruency with identified guides can result in exceptionally positive consequences because 
one has met central goals that define who one is individually and in relation to important 
others. The relationship between the actual self and introjected guides can also produce 
negative or positive psychological consequences, but these guides are experienced as ego 
dystonic, and they are less fundamental to one's core sense of self than are identified 
guides. The fact that these guides are introjected and not identified means that  one has  not  
accepted  them  as  a  shared reality about the self. The power of introjected guides,  
however,  should not  be  quickly  dismissed. 1  Discrepancy  with introjected  guides can 
have serious negative psychological consequences when individuals believe that there are 
significant and undesirable consequences associated with discrepancy, such as loss of love 
and acceptance  or punishment.  That  is,  outcome contingency beliefs are probably a key 
characteristic in determining the psychological  consequences of discrepancy with 
introjected rather than identified guides; in contrast, discrepancy with  identified  guides  
can,  in  and  of  itself, produce significant distress. 
Not all self-guides have their origins in parental guides. There are a variety of other life 
experiences that influence the development of self-regulation. In addition to parents, a 
wide range of significant others (e.g., other family members; teachers; social, political, 
and religious figures; and fictional characters) are important in molding the self-guides 
that individuals  adopt.  These  influences  may  be especially important if they coincide with 
an individual's particular life circumstance, interests, or talents. If these guides are  adopted as 
one's own, their self-regulatory significance can equal that of identified parental guides 
because they represent a shared reality about  the  self with specific individuals or society in 
general (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1996b). Thus, these independent self-guides (i.e., 
inde- pendent of the parental standpoint) can be as important as identified parental guides in 
self-regulation. 
In  a recent  study  that  examined  the  consequences of internalization  (Moretti  & Higgins, · 
in press), we differentiated  and operationalized the measurement  of three types of  self-
regulatory guides: identified or shared parental guides, introjected  or  nonshared  parental  
guides,  and independent  guides  (see  Figure  3).  Identified guides include  only  those  
parental  guides that are adopted  as one's own and thus represent  a shared reality about the 
self. Introjected  guides are those parental guides that are not adopted as one's   own   and   thus   
remain   as   the   "felt presence"  of  parents   within   the  self-system. Finally, independent  
self-guides include guides that are not represented in the parental stand- point on the self and 
are probably derived from sources other than the parental relationship. In each case, self-
guides are either in an active regulatory relationship with the actual self or not currently active 
in self-regulation but could become active if primed. 
Drawing from our analysis of the self- regulatory consequences of internalization, we predicted 
that identified and independent guides would be more strongly related to emotional and 
interpersonal functioning than would introjected guides. We also examined sex differences in 
the significance of self-regulatory guides, anticipating that identified guides representing a 
shared reality about the self with parents would be more important for females than males. 
Participants completed the Selves Questionnaire, listing attributes describing their actual self 
and attributes describing their ideal self and their ought self from their own standpoint, their 
mother's standpoint, and their father's stand- point. Responses were scored according to 
standard procedures to determine congruency and discrepancy between the actual self and self-
guides (Moretti & Higgins, 1990b). Once this was determined, responses were scored again 
to determine the percentages  of matches, mismatches, and nonmatches that were shared 
between the own and parental guide (identified guides), unique to the parental guide 
(introjected guides) 
1 Introjected parental guides that are not actively involved in self-regulation may become active as a consequence of 
priming. For example, it is not uncommon for individuals to find that certain cognitive-emotional and behavioral  pat- 
terns associated with parental standpoints on the self are relatively absent in their lives but return on reengagement 
with parents. The returnpf these patterns of behavior may be due to priming of self-parent representations, including 
introjected guides. Introjected parental guides that influence behavior only once they are primed are probably less 
significant in self-regulation than are chronically accessible introjected parental guides. 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
 
 
and unique to the own guide (independent guides). Participants also completed measures of 
psychological distress (Symptom Check- list-90-R; Derogatis, 1983) and interpersonal problems 
(Revised Inventory of Interpersonal Problems; Alden, Wiggins, & Pincus, 1990; Horowitz, 
Rosenberg, Baer, Ureno, & Villasenor, 1988). 
For the parental guides, the study found that less than half (40%) were classified as identified or 
shared guides and that more than half (60%) were classified as introjected parental guides. The 
identified guides were more likely than the introjected parental guides to be active in self-
regulation (i.e., to be related to the actual self). Even though only 40% of parental guides 
were identified, these guides constituted a substantial overlapping proportion of the own guides 
(44%):· The remaining own self-guides (56%) were independent of parental guides. As 
predicted, identified and independent  self- guides  were  most predictive  of emotional  and 
interpersonal  functioning. When  the actual self-matched identified and independent self-
guides, individuals reported lower levels of psychological distress and fewer interpersonal 
problems; when the actual self was discrepant from these guides, individuals reported more 
distress and interpersonal difficulty. Introjected parental guides, the "felt presence" of parents 
within the self-system, were generally not predictive of functioning. 
As predicted, important gender differences emerged in the study. Although  similar propor- 
tions of parental guides were classified as identified, introjected, and independent  for males and 
females, these guides were not of comparable importance in self-regulation. Con- sistent with 
our hypothesis, the relation between the actual self and identified parental guides significantly 
predicted functioning in  females but not males, whereas the relation between the actual self 
and independent self-guides significantly predicted functioning in males but not females. 
Interestingly, introjected mother parental guides were also predictive of functioning in females. 
These findings are consistent with the view that females tend to be socialized to construe and 
regulate themselves in terms of interpersonal relationships, whereas males are encouraged to 
develop a sense of self that is autonomous and independent from parents. It is important to 
understand, however, that these results do not imply that relationships are important for females 
and trivial for males. What the results do suggest is that the psychological and self-regulatory 
meaning of parental standpoints is quite different for fe- males and males (see also Higgins, 
Loeb, & Moretti,  1995). 
A similar pattern of findings was revealed in our recent study of internalization in 
adolescents (Moretti & Wiebe, in press). Although sex differences were not found in the 
percentage of identified, introjected, and independent guides represented in the self-system, 
the self- regulatory significance of these guides differed for male and female adolescents . 
For female adolescents, discrepancy between the actual self and parental standards predicted 
emotional problems, regardless of whether these standards were shared between girls and their 
parents (identified parental standards) or not (introjected parental standards). Discrepancy with 
standards that were independent from parents also pre- dieted problems in girls. In contrast, 
discrepancy with independent standards, but not identified or introjected parental standards, 
predicted internalizing problems for male adolescents. 
The standards that males report as independent of their parental guides may be shared with 
their peers, and self-regulation toward these standards may have both positive and negative 
consequences. When male adolescents meet the standards that they share with their peers, 
they may enjoy some measure of social acceptance and success.  At  the  same  time,  
engagement in activities that are congruent with the standards of their peer group may  be  
associated with increased externalizing or "problematic" behavior. 
The gender differences we observed in the relevance of own and parental standards are 
consistent with previous findings (Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995; Higgins, Loeb, & Ruble, 
1995). Specifically, this research has shown that for male adolescents in comparison with 
female adolescents discrepancy between the actual self and peer self-guides decreased 
between Grades 8 and 9, whereas discrepancy between the actual self and parental  guides 
increased.  In other words, boys more than girls moved away from parental guides and 
toward peer guides during early adolescence. But this transition was emotionally difficult for 
boys, and conflict between peer and parental self-guides was associated with feelings of 
confusion. 
Comparison  of  results  from  our  study  of adolescents and results based on young 
adults (Moretti & Higgins, in press) showed that the percentage of parental guides that is 
identified or shared is lower in adolescents (25%) than in young adults (40%). Conversely, 
the percentage of parental guides that are not adopted as one's own (i.e., introjected parental 
guides) is higher in  adolescents  (75%)  than  in  young  adults (60%). These  results  are 
consistent  with  re- search showing that it is not until late adolescence or early adulthood 
that individuals are able to integrate their own views with those that parents hold for them 
(Harter & Monsor, 1992).  
This research illustrates the importance  of understanding how internalization, as a central 
process underlying the interrelations between own  and  other  standpoints,  functions  
within self-regulation . Our methodology  provides  a new avenue for research in this area, 
allowing researchers to measure the specific self-other quality of self-regulatory guides. 
Further re- search examining individual differences and developmental processes involved in 
internalization will enrich understanding of the interpersonal nature of the self-system. More 
specifically, our work provides preliminary evidence that not all significant other standpoints 
have equal self-regulatory significance. For example, the maternal standpoint seems to have 
particular significance for adolescent girls and young adult women, but the peer standpoint has 
particular relevance for adolescent boys. There may be much value in investigating what is 
unique and what is invariant across other standpoint perspectives on the self. 
In our current work, we have focused on the "internal audience," that is, individuals' 
internal self-other representations . Clearly, this plays an important role in self-regulation. 
Nonetheless, care must be taken to ensure attention to how individuals construct meaning 
within the con- text of "real" interactions in significant relation- ships. Holmes and his 
colleagues (Murray  & Holmes, 1993, 1995; Murray, Holmes, & Griffen, 1996) have 
provided robust evidence that relationship satisfaction and duration are linked to the 
capacity of romantic partners to jointly construct and maintain a positive, albeit idealized, 
view of the relationship and partner qualities. The emergence of a shared and positive 
view of self-other relationships is negotiated between partners and depends on their 
willingness to enter into the joint construction of this view; it cannot be sustained by either 
partner alone, regardless of how positive and idealized his or her internal representation 
might be (Holmes & Murray, 1995; Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, 1998). 
Thus, the internal audience does not  stand on its own, separate from the flow of 
interactions in the world. Unfortunately, the majority of researchers have focused on the 
psychological consequences of either the internal audience or interpersonal interactions 
and relationship quality. Rarely has the dynamic relationship between these two aspects of 
experience been examined despite the fact that neither can be fully understood in 
isolation. How and to what extent do experiences in relationships contribute to change in 
the internal audience? A full examination of this question is beyond the scope of the current 
article; however, the therapeutic process is precisely focused on the issue and offers some 
insights in this regard . We turn now to a brief examination of-the implications of  our 
discussion for understanding the therapeutic process. 
 
Therapeutic Implications of Self-Other  Representations 
Clinicians have long argued that psychological disturbance is linked to fundamental prob- 
lems in the self-system (Homey, 1939; Kohut, 1971; Kohut & Wolf, 1992; Sullivan, 1953). 
Several schools of psychotherapy identify the self-system as the target of psychological 
intervention, although the nature of such interventions and their intended effects are 
conceptualized in vastly different ways. For example, psychodynamic  therapists  observe 
transference 
-aspects of the therapeutic relationship as a reflection of the underlying deficits of  the 
client's self-system, and changes in the therapeutic relationship are a barometer of progress or 
resistance. Perhaps the most central intervention of the therapist is the provision of empathy 
for the client's struggles, coupled with support and constructive interpretation. In a sense, 
the therapist uses these tactics to scaffold the client into a more adaptive relationship that 
provides the opportunity to experience the self more fully and to integrate previously 
fragmented aspects of the self. 
On the surface, cognitive therapists take a very different approach. They (Beck,  1976; Beck, 
Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) argue that early experiences are organized and represented in 
schemas about the  self, the world, and the future. In some individuals, beliefs about real or 
imagined rejection are integrated into the self-schema early in life and become dormant until 
triggered by loss. Once activated, these dysfunctional schemas produce distortions in 
information processing because of the deleterious impact of negative self-beliefs. Cognitive 
therapists target these beliefs and work collaboratively with clients to revise them to be 
more adaptive and reasonable. 
Despite the differences between these approaches, both acknowledge that clients' self- 
system-their unique way of interpreting and experiencing the world-is the crux of psycho- 
therapy. Yet little has been done to develop a systematic approach to understanding the 
multiplicity of self-system problems that give rise to psychological distress. Thus, therapists 
can fall prey to treating clients with quite different self-system problems as if they were the 
same. For example, many clients may suffer from "low self-esteem," yet this symptom derives 
from distinct types of self-regulatory failures. 
In our earlier work (Moretti, Higgins, & Feldman, 1990), we described how self- discrepancy 
theory provides a framework for organizing diverse therapeutic interventions to maximize their 
effect on the self-system in depression. We argued that there were several advantages to 
understanding the impact of therapeutic interventions in terms of their effects on the self-system 
and systematically organizing interventions in light of this understanding to maximize potential 
change. By identifying the self-system as the target and as an integrating theme of intervention, 
self-system therapy cuts across the rigid boundaries of major psychotherapeutic models and 
encourages therapists to systematically use diverse techniques to alter specific aspects of self-
system vulnerability. Hence, the distinctive characteristic of self- system therapy is not the type 
of therapeutic technique that is used. Instead, it is the knowledge of self-system functioning to 
guide the use of techniques and the identification of the self-system as a target of the 
intervention. 
In treating depression, we proposed that it is critical for therapists to focus on changing the 
extent and accessibility of actual-ideal self- discrepancy (see Moretti et al., 1990, and Strauman, 
1998, for an extended discussion of self-system intervention strategies). By under- standing the 
self-system problems described, therapists can further increase the specificity and effectiveness of 
therapeutic interventions. In addition to distinguishing actual-ideal and actual-ought self-
discrepancies, we have identified  several  sources of discrepancy  within  the self-system 
involving own versus other stand- points. These include discrepancy between the actual self and 
own standpoint self-guides (actual-own self-discrepancy), discrepancy be- tween the actual self 
and significant other standpoint self-guides (actual-other self-discrepancy), and discrepancy 
between own standpoint self-guides and significant other standpoint self-guides (guide-guide 
conflict). The difficulties associated with an overreliance on  either own standpoint or other 
standpoint self- regulatory systems have been addressed. The importance of the internalization 
process and the implications for understanding the psychological relevance of parental and other 
self-guides have been discussed. Therapeutic interventions can be used to alter the accessibility 
of each of these self-system problems. For example, if clients chronically self-regulate toward 
the inferred self-guides of significant others, it may be beneficial to use techniques that increase 
the accessibility of their own standpoint self- regulatory system (e.g., encourage them to consider 
their own hopes, wishes, duties, and obligations). Doing so may reduce their dependency on 
others for maintenance of self-esteem and broaden their opportunities to derive a sense of self-
worth and competence. Similarly, if clients chronically regulate toward their own standpoint, it 
may be beneficial to use techniques that increase the accessibility of other standpoints within the 
self-system (e.g., encourage clients to consider the hopes, wishes, duties, and obligations that 
others hold for them and encourage them to take others' perspectives on the self). This may 
open new avenues for developing intimacy and a sense of connected- ness in their relationships. 
At times, it may be therapeutic to focus on shifting patterns of accessibility away from 
actual-guide discrepancy and toward actual- guide congruency. In other instances, work may 
be best directed at increasing awareness of the factors that underlie actual-guide 
discrepancy. From this perspective, it may be necessary to draw attention to self-
discrepancies to facilitate therapeutic exploration and change  (Fromm- Reichman, 1960; 
Klerman, Weissman, Rounsaville, & Chevron, 1984; Sullivan, 1956). What- ever therapeutic 
orientation is adopted, it is important to understand the impact of interventions 
systematically. Interventions that focus on one element of the self-system may be ineffective 
and perhaps even deleterious because the impact on the entire self-system is different from 
what is intended by the therapist. By knowing the complexity of relationships among 
various self-representations and the factors that influence the processing of self-related 
information (Moretti et al., 1996; Moretti & Shaw, 1989), therapists can be more precise in 
their deployment of interventions (Andersen & Berk, 1998; Moretti, 1991; Moretti et al., 
1990; Strauman, 1994; Strauman & Kolden, 1997; Teasdale & Segal, 1995; Westen, 1991). 
In particular, understanding the nature of own versus other standpoints within the self-
system can be useful to therapists in understanding the relationships that their clients have 
both inside and outside of therapy. By understanding internal representations of self and 
other and the dynamic interplay between them, therapists are better able to use the 
therapeutic relationship with their clients as a vehicle for change. For example, it is 
reasonable to extrapolate from our discussion that transference aspects of the therapeutic 
relationship probably represent cli- ent representations of standpoints on the self . This is 
consistent with work by Andersen and her colleagues (Andersen & Berk, 1998; Andersen, 
Glassman, & Gold, 1998; Andersen et al., 1997) showing that information derived from 
relationships with significant others influ- ences evaluations of new acquaintances and may 
raise expectations of similar interaction patterns. For example, research has shown that affect 
associated with a significant other causes undergraduates to like or dislike a novel person, to be 
motivated to approach or avoid him or her emotionally, and to expect acceptance or 
rejection based on the degree of resemblance of the novel person with the significant other 
(Andersen, Reznik, & Manzella, 1996). Indeed, changes in the content of the working self- 
concept also occur in this process-in the direction of the self-with-the-significant other- 
such that undergraduates become who they are with their significant other when with a new 
person who resembles that significant other (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996). 
The therapeutic relationship typically affords a very powerful context that evokes or activates 
representations of self-other experiences in significant relationships . Considering that indi- 
viduals internally represent multiple standpoint representations on the self (e.g., mother, 
father, and significant other), it is likely that the transference relationship in therapy will take on 
characteristics of these diverse standpoint perspectives at different points in time. A client may 
move from a hostile to submissive stance as aspects of therapy activate or prime different 
standpoints on the self. This suggests  that transference in a therapeutic context, as well as in 
everyday interpersonal relationships, does not necessarily have a direct correspondence to 
representations of one specific relationship with a  significant   other.  Rather,   it  may   be  
best understood as a dynamic and fluid interplay between activation of multiple standpoint 
representations in conjunction with real experiences in the new relationship. Understanding 
transference in these terms can provide a more complete understanding of the diverse relational 
influences at play in the relationship and assist therapists in successfully negotiating the turbu- 
lence of the therapeutic process and supporting change. Moreover, this analysis can be helpful 
in understanding that transference is rarely, if ever, based solely on projection of elements of a 
single significant relationship independent of features of the new relationship at hand. 
Psychodynamic theorists have long recognized the importance of internalization in the 
therapeutic process. Our analysis of the internalization process illustrates the relevance of an 
integrative approach in understanding the im- pact of internal representations on self- regulation. 
The therapeutic relationship offers the possibility of experiencing the self in a new and curative 
self-other context (Blatt, Auer- bach, & Aryan, 1998; Blatt, Auerbach, & Levy, 1997; Blatt, 
Stayner, Auerbach, & Behrends, 1996). In effect, the therapist, in the context of the therapeutic 
relationship, can become a new standpoint on the self, a standpoint that offers new ways of 
reflecting on the self and new opportunities for adaptive growth. To the extent that therapists 
understand this to be the  case, they can strategically contribute to change by contributing to the 
development of this new standpoint on the self, one that can be openly discussed and 
negotiated within  the therapeutic relationship and internalized into the self- system. 
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